How do you rebuild Somalia whose fabric, as a nation, is in tatters? Such a question, as startling as it maybe, does not even begin to capture the magnitude of disaster which we Somalis brought on ourselves. One must live it, and especially be the victim of it over and over again to be fully appreciative of the calamity.

But, if one is to try to address what the pregnant-with-a- problem question begs, which is a solution, one should rather not give an obvious answer, such as it will take “good leaders who will lead the ready to be led.” Mind you, however valid such simplistic answer maybe, it does not point out or negate where these leaders, in a society, will be made. Will they come from a brokered conference outside Somalia, what has been the usual route so far for resolving Somalia’s problems? Or will they and their followers spring up from even the smallest, dirty poor village in the country?  

And if we are to cite a situation in the world to serve as a guide, of how to go about resolving Somalia’s terrible situation of about 2 decades, we should not give “the US journey to independence and its visionary founding fathers” as an example; Nor, for that matter, any journey of any country, including ours, for independence. They do not apply. A nation under the yoke of conventional colonialism is naturally unified by the very injustice of its colonizers. We Somalis been there and successfully done that. Let us not compare apples and oranges, as if they would be the same!

To those who say Somalia’s outstanding anarchy cannot be reversed from the bottom-up, you should explain what the short-lived success of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) was. Whatever misgivings one had about the Courts, these are the undeniable facts: that it started with one court in one neighborhood in Mogadishu, from grassroots; a one court’s success inspired other neighborhoods to establish their own, respective and independent courts. Then, they together created a joint committee to coordinate efforts. Financially, they initially sustained themselves by the fees they charged for services. When they had shown their capabilities of providing law and order in the neighborhoods, businesses poured money into them. At the end, Courts joined forces and became one powerful unit; so powerful that in one swoop they had easily routed the combined forces of the most formidable warlords in Somalia.  

Obviously, as the Courts assumed the mantle of power in Mogadishu and other places in southern and central Somalia, its members were corrupted by it. They lost sight of the principles contained therein of the very religion, Islam, on which they based their movement. Had they truly applied the true Islam, as we Somalis have known and lived for ages, they could have been a genuine conduit for a lasting peace and reconciliation among Somali brothers and sisters. That was not to be; instead they had committed political hubris, which led to their downfall, which also lead many, me included, to come to believe that Islam was used or misused from the get-go for other designs.

Nonetheless, on how and from where the Courts had risen to power is a strong case, in a country which comes apart at the seams, for grassroots, bottom-up strategy. It need not be religiously based either! The Courts’ eventual failure, from lack of vision, religious extremism, uncompromising rigidness, and calling fatal regional and international attention on themselves, does not in anyway diminish the genius behind its reach: from humble beginnings to the pinnacle of Somali politics! It would be a mistake to simply dismiss, for its many shortcomings, the grassroots reservoir the Courts tabbed. It should be something studied and copied, for the right reasons, to give common folk throughout Somalia hope and empowerment.

Another case to mention would be Lebanon with similar prolonged civil war; however, it took her rich and well-to-do Arab brothers to intervene at the end with force by Syria and, at the same time, political settlement by the Saudi Kingdom. Unfortunately, we Somalis have only one tiny sister country, Djibouti, which is not even in a position to successfully defend its small territory. Just as we Somalis, as a race, are unique in this world, we are truly alone. We only have each other; yet, we seem not to get enough of killing one another. A dreadful thing, indeed!

There have been civil wars in different parts of the world, most of which successfully ended by international military, political and financial interventions. Somalia had its share of such attempts, but there is something about our people that seems not receptive to interventions. This includes the top-down formations of Somali governments outside of Somalia, including the current TFG. The Somali semi-elite, most of them with militia assets, were the chosen few in some air conditioned conference halls outside Somalia to represent millions, who they victimized in the civil war. In the interest of peace, there has to be a genuine reconciliation between enemies, between victims and their tormentors. It is the promise, more than anything else, of peace and a better tomorrow for all concerned that is at the heart of any reconciliation. The people at the lowest hierarchy, where the pulse of the nation lies, must be made to buy into such promise by concrete actions.

A wise person once said “success has thousand fathers and failure is an orphan.” If the TFG cannot deliver to common folks the security they desperately need, then it will find itself an orphan, deserted not only by the people but also their very Ethiopian body guards. However, it is not too late for it to change course. One way to do that is to first get rid of the mentality that it can subdue the violence in Somalia by borrowed force. The nature of using force by the TFG and its ally entails a daily, grave and unintended consequence of unacceptable civilian deaths, as it is difficult to precisely respond to moving targets of guerilla warfare.
To give the TFG a due credit, however, it would seem that it has succeeded in negotiations with good part of the opposition. This should be immediately carried to its logical conclusion of unity government between the TFG and the 2 Sharifs’ group. The TFG must cede a substantial power and positions to its new ally.

In the end, any Somali government which is indifferent to common folks will not sustain itself. It must find a way to win them over, by empowering them. How do you do that? Well, the TFG should start by not attacking Kismayo to undo whatever entity that took over there. Instead, it should first try a political settlement by sending a UN or an Arab delegation to negotiate a peaceful way out, which will leave Kismayo in the hands of its dwellers, not the Islamists or the TFG. That will send a clear signal of empowering the locals there.

For the rest of Somalia, the Somali government must also cede power to each locality; let them decide who their leaders will be. While this will be tricky in big cities, such as Mogadishu, 90% of the rest of Somalia, the dotting villages and towns, could decide among themselves on their leaders in a matter of hours. Let them do their meetings, debates and compromises, among elders, business and religious groups, to decide who should lead them. Let them organize their security. This is where the old fashion Somali way, of clan and subclan consultations and compromised should be employed. At the moment, Somalia is not ripe for western-style elections. There will, hopefully, be a time for that! Local leaders and their constituencies will need financial help, and the government with the help of international community must device a way to efficiently and adequately provide support for locals. 

Hussein Ablele
E-Mail:hesseinab77@hotmail.com 

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